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Background
A firewall is one of the most vital network defense components that can be used to filter 
unsolicited traffic. A packet-filter firewall can filter packets based on fields in the net-
work layer and transport layer such as the source internet protocol (IP) address, desti-
nation IP address, source and destination port address, and protocol field. The firewall 
will perform its job of filtering packets based on a set of rules written by the administra-
tor. The number of rules and the traffic that must be filtered depend upon the organiza-
tion’s security policy. A firewall is typically placed at the network perimeter as shown in 
Fig. 1. A typical scenario consists of an internal network, a de-militarized zone (DMZ), 
the Public Network, and a Branch Office network. The internal network must be pro-
tected from the public network. The DMZ contains systems and servers that normally 
are meant for public access. There can be trusted and non-trusted or blacklisted hosts in 
the public network.
Abstract 
A firewall is the most essential component of network perimeter security. Due to 
human error and the involvement of multiple administrators in configuring firewall 
rules, there exist common anomalies in firewall rulesets such as Shadowing, Generali-
zation, Correlation, and Redundancy. There is a need for research on efficient ways of 
resolving such anomalies. The challenge is also to see that the reordered or resolved 
ruleset conforms to the organization’s framed security policy. This study proposes an 
ant colony optimization (ACO)-based anomaly resolution and reordering of firewall 
rules called ACO-based firewall anomaly mitigation engine. Modified strategies are also 
introduced to automatically detect these anomalies and to minimize manual interven-
tion of the administrator. Furthermore, an adaptive reordering strategy is proposed to 
aid faster reordering when a new rule is appended. The proposed approach was tested 
with different firewall policy sets. The results were found to be promising in terms of 
the number of conflicts resolved, with minimal availability loss and marginal security 
risk. This work demonstrated the application of a metaheuristic search technique, 
ACO, in improving the performance of a packet-filter firewall with respect to mitigat-
ing anomalies in the rules, and at the same time demonstrated conformance to the 
security policy.
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The security policy that must be enforced at the main office firewall is shown in 
Table  1. The firewall ruleset that was evolved by the administrator in the process of 
implementing the security policy at main office firewall is listed in Table 2. 
Firewall anomalies
Often, more than one administrator might be involved in writing or appending rules to 
the firewall. When the size of the ruleset grows, the complexity and interdependency of 
the rules increase and might be susceptible to errors, which can lead to anomalies. These 
anomalies are often unavoidable due to human error and often cannot be detected and 
corrected manually. There are four types of anomalies in packet-filter firewalls (Al-Shaer 
and Hamed 2004a, b; Yuan et  al. 2006), as follows: (1) shadowing, (2) generalization, 
(3) correlation and (4) redundancy. Among the four mentioned anomalies, shadowing, 
generalization and correlation considered “policy conflicts” because these anomalies are 
Fig. 1 Typical organizational firewall placement scenario (Policy 1)
Table 1 Security policy to be implemented at main office firewall of Fig. 1
1. Full access is to be given to the organization telnet server for the organization administrator’s home IP 
“10.44.128.112”
2. Full access is to be given to the organization telnet server for the organization’s work from home IP address 
“192.168.5.64”
3. Full access is to be given to the organization telnet server for the organization’s work from home IP address 
“192.168.15.253”
4. The technical department of the branch office having IP “172.19.55.124” must have access to the entire organi-
zation’s internal network
5. The Sales Department of the branch office having IP “172.19.55.121” must have access to web server 
“10.12.32.21” and ftp server “10.12.32.24” of the organization only
6. Access to webserver http port “10.12.32.21: 80” must be open to all
7. All remaining access from untrusted source “172.19.55.122” except http connection to web server is to be 
stopped
8. All remaining access from untrusted source “172.19.55.123” except http connection to web server is to be 
stopped
9. All remaining access from untrusted source “10.45.48.34” except http connection to web server is to be 
stopped
10. All remaining access from untrusted source “172.19.64.221” except http connection to web server is to be 
stopped
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caused by rules with interdependency but that have different actions. However, Redun-
dancy exists because of rules with interdependencies that have the same action.
Shadowing
A rule is considered shadowed by one or a set of preceding rules if each packet matched 
by this rule is also matched by those preceding rules but takes a different action. For 
example in the ruleset showed in Table  2, rules “9, 12, and 13” are shadowed by rule 
“4.” That is, any packet that matches any one of rules “9, 12, and 13” whose actions are 
“Deny” also matches rule “4,” whose action is “Allow.”
Generalization
A rule is considered a generalized rule if it is a superset of any preceding rules but with 
a different action. For example, rule “9” is a generalized rule of rules “7 and 8.” Rule 9’s 
action is Deny whereas Rule 7 and 8’s actions are Allow.
Correlation
Two rules are considered correlated if they have an intersection of rule spaces, i.e., one 
rule is a superset to the other in some part of the fields and vice versa. Rule pairs (6, 5), 
(9, 2), (12, 2), and (13, 2) are correlated from Table 2.
Redundancy
A rule is declared redundant if the action taken by the firewall on a packet does not 
change even when it is removed from the ruleset. For example, rule “8” in Table  2 is 
redundant because the set of packets matched to rule “8” also matches to rule “2” and 
both perform the same action, i.e., “Allow.” Therefore, removing or moving rule “8” will 
not affect the firewall.
Table 2 Initial configuration of firewall rules (Policy 1)
Rule Protocol Source IP Source 
port
Destination IP Destination 
port
Action
1 * 172.19.55.124 * 10.12.32.21–10.12.32.22 1–80 Allow
2 TCP 172.19.55.* * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
3 TCP 192.168.5.64 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
4 * 172.19.55.121–
172.19.55.124
* 10.12.32.* * Allow
5 * 10.45.48.34 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
6 * 10.*.*.* * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
7 TCP 172.19.55.121 * 10.12.32.24 20–21 Allow
8 TCP 172.19.55.121 * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
9 * 172.19.55.121 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
10 TCP 192.168.15.253 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
11 TCP 10.44.128.112 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
12 * 172.19.55.122 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
13 * 172.19.55.123 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
14 * 172.19.64.221 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
Page 4 of 32Penmatsa et al. SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1032 
These anomalies often results in unintended behavior and may cause loss of availabil-
ity and/or security risk to the organizational resources. Therefore detection and resolu-
tion of such anomalies in an efficient way is very much essential for any organization.
The remainder of this article is arranged as follows: “Related work” section presents 
the previous work in the domain along with their limitations and also the highlights of 
our proposed solution. “Anomaly detection methodology” section discusses anomaly 
detection technique using segmentation and grid representation process with an exam-
ple. The role of “Action Constraint Generation” (ACG) and Strategies used for ACG in 
the process of resolving anomalies are discussed in “Anomaly resolving” section. The 
proposed modifications, primarily the new Trust Factor (TF)-based ACG, the role of 
ACO in anomaly resolving and reordering, and the adaptive reordering algorithm are 
provided in “ACOFAME” section. The experimentation results, analysis and comparison 
with the existing system are presented in “Experimentation results and comparison” sec-
tion, and conclusion and future scope are provided in the last section.
Related work
An earlier study by Wool (2004) revealed that corporate firewalls suffer from poor con-
figurations. The author analyzed rulesets gathered from several corporate firewalls and 
found that misconfigurations in framing rules caused breaches of security policies. Wool 
(2010) also proved that the number of errors is correlated to the ruleset complexity. 
Later, the same author analyzed several corporate firewalls and found that the same situ-
ation prevailed and misconfigurations in the firewall rules were ubiquitous.
The framework called “fast detect” (Hari et  al. 2000) was one of the earlier works 
focused on detecting and resolving correlation conflicts by reordering rules. The authors 
addressed individual local conflicts; however, global conflicts were not addressed. They 
identified a circular looping problem among the conflicting rules, even after reordering. 
The authors proposed resolving filters to break circular loops within the rules to solve 
the problem. The fast-detect algorithm is not suitable for five-tuple firewalls because it 
is only based on two-tuples, source and destination IP addresses. The authors tried to 
address the five-tuple issue by maintaining three-tuples as constants. However, the solu-
tion was not feasible for real-valued five-tuples.
The authors of Al-Shaer and Hamed (2004a, b) made an effort to find the errors in the 
firewall rules of different organizations. They found that many such anomalies are unin-
tended and mostly caused by human mistakes. Firewall anomalies are classified into four 
types: shadowing, generalization, correlation, and redundancy. The authors proposed 
anomaly detection with the help of a tree representation of the rules. A path from the 
root to the leaf node of one rule not colliding with that of another rule implies no anom-
aly. If the paths of two rules collide, then there exists an anomaly. The authors left the 
resolving part to the administrator for manual intervention. They also proposed a Fire-
wall Policy Advisor that helps in editing the rule and guides the administrator in insert-
ing a new rule at an appropriate position to remove anomalies. However, the results 
were not checked against security policy conformation.
The authors of Yuan et al. (2006), Benelbahri and Bouhoula (2007) and Al-Shaer and 
Hamed (2004a, b) have suggested methodologies to detect pairwise anomalies. The 
authors left the resolving part to the administrators, giving the details of the conflicts 
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present in the rules. The authors of Yuan et al. (2006) designed a tool called “FIREMAN,” 
which tries to detect anomalies existing in stateless firewalls. They also tried to minimize 
the size of the policy by summarizing. The authors converted a firewall policy into a rule 
graph and used Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) to detect anomalies. The limitation is 
that the graph was able to detect only pairwise anomalies, in which it compares the pre-
sent rule with preceding rules but not with succeeding rules.
In Benelbahri and Bouhoula (2007) the authors proposed an algebraic mathematical 
method for detecting anomalies. They also proposed a new language for writing rules 
by designing a compiler to parse the rules; however, the resolution was not addressed in 
that study. The authors in Muhammad et al. (2006) proposed pair-wise anomaly detec-
tion. Here, one rule is compared with another rule and the process takes action based on 
the relationship of the two rules. A semi-automated detection and resolving strategy of 
firewall anomalies was proposed that followed a default-deny policy for the packets that 
fell into the conflict space. The default-deny policy might increase the availability loss, 
although the policy might reduce the security risk. The author in Alex (2009) designed a 
tool to guide the user in entering new rules into existing firewalls without creating con-
flicts, but detection or resolving already-existing anomalies was not addressed.
The authors in Pozo et al. (2008) were able to detect global anomalies by dividing the 
rules into groups so that the administrator could easily address the smaller groups inde-
pendently. The ruleset was initially converted to a potential conflict graph (PCG). Then, 
the PCG was divided into independent clusters of inconsistence rules (ICIR). However, 
the resolver was manual.
The authors in Liang et  al. (2014) developed a firewall anomaly detector to identify 
shadowing and correlation using ordered binary decision trees. The authors provided a 
formal model to detect global conflicts in firewall policies. The model was able to detect 
both local and global conflicts efficiently. The ordered binary tree was able to reduce 
false positives. This study did not present any anomaly resolver.
“Firewall Anomaly Management Environment (FAME)” (Hu et  al. 2012). was able 
to detect and resolve the anomalies in firewall policies both locally and globally. The 
authors used a “risk value-based combination algorithm” to reorder the rules semi-auto-
matically to eliminate Shadowing, Generalization, and Correlation anomalies. FAME 
also had a redundancy viewer to eliminate redundancies in firewall policies; however, 
the viewer was addressed in a separate phase. In Hu et al. (2012), the rule space was ini-
tially divided into disjoint segments, and then a mapping was conducted to discover con-
flicted and non-conflicted segments. Once this mapping was performed, semi-automatic 
methods were used to reorder the rules to resolve the conflicts. The authors employed a 
“Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)-based Risk Level” to decide whether to 
Allow or Deny packets that belonged to a conflicted segment. The only means of resolv-
ing the conflicts or anomalies accidentally created by administrators was to follow tech-
niques to reorder the rules. Permutation and Greedy algorithms were used in Hu et al. 
(2012) to select the best order of rules, which can avoid conflicts. However, although the 
permutation method produces the best order of rules, it is much too time consuming. 
Conversely, the greedy method was quick but might not produce the best-ordered result.
In the literature, additional works that have addressed firewall rule anomaly detec-
tion include Abbes et al. (2008), Ben Neji and Bouhoula (2011), Bouhoula et al. (2008), 
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Matsumoto and Bouhoula (2008), Saadaoui et  al. (2014). In Abbes et  al. (2008) the 
authors proposed rule anomaly detection based on a tree structure that represented the 
rules. An inference system was used to construct the tree and to identify the anoma-
lies. The tree structure helped to find the anomalies more quickly. However, no resolving 
techniques were proposed.
In Bouhoula et al. (2008), the authors proposed an efficient means of detecting fire-
wall anomalies using a matrix-based method and also proposed methods to rectify those 
anomalies. In Matsumoto and Bouhoula (2008), the authors depicted the importance of 
security policy, and they proposed a method to verify the firewall rules against the pol-
icy. The work proposed in Saadaoui et al. (2014) is similar recent work that successfully 
addressed detection of all of the types of anomalies by dividing them into two categories: 
superfluous and conflicting. The authors used a two-dimensional grid in the detection 
phase, which was a simple and efficient detection technique. The authors of Saadaoui 
et al. (2014) also proposed a resolving method that would remove the shadowed rules; in 
the case of correlated rules, they inserted a new rule. However, this approach had limi-
tations; occasionally, removing rules could violate the security policy, whereas adding 
rules increased the ruleset size.
In summary, several issues must be addressed in the case of packer-filter firewall 
anomaly mitigation. There is a need to investigate automated anomaly resolution tech-
niques that can help to minimize human error. Another important issue is security 
policy conformation even after resolution of existing anomalies. There is also a need to 
research optimizing ruleset size by eliminating redundant rules.
Contributions of this study
One solution to avoiding induced anomalies of the firewall rules and removing any 
redundant rules is reordering. Finding the best order of rules among all possible orders 
is a combinatorial optimization problem. To date, no one has studied the application of 
Ant Colony Optimization as a metaheuristic search to reorder packet-filter firewall rules.
This study proposes a framework with the following features:
1. Introduces a concept called “TF” to establish a relationship between the security pol-
icy and the anomaly resolver. TF helps in conforming to the security policy even after 
reordering.
2. Proposes methods to automate the anomaly mitigation process with the help of 
modified “Action Constraint Generation” strategies.
3. Applies ACO to generate an optimized set of ordered rules, which not only removes 
anomalies but also eliminates redundancy in this process.
4. Introduces an algorithm that adaptively handles a newly entered rule to avoid run-
ning the tool for the entire ruleset and hence save much time.
The proposed system will be called the ACO-based Firewall Anomaly Mitigation 
Engine (ACOFAME). The results of experimentation conducted on several rulesets 
have proved that our approach has improved firewall performance when measured with 
important evaluation parameters such as the number of conflicts resolved, availability 
loss and security risk.
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Anomaly detection methodology
A packet-filter firewall works on five fields. Each field has its range of values and can be 
considered operating in a five-dimensional continuous packet space. Manual identifica-
tion of anomalies is very difficult. Several researchers have proposed methodologies to 
identify anomalies (Hu et al. 2012; Liang et al. 2014; Hari et al. 2000; Alex 2009; Pozo 
et al. 2008; Yuan et al. 2006; Benelbahri and Bouhoula 2007; Al-Shaer and Hamed 2004a, 
b). A BDD-based segmentation approach was used in Hu et al. (2012); the firewall-rule 
packet space was represented in the form of “Segmentation and Grid.”
Segmentation
Figures 2, 3 and 4 shows the process of segmentation for sample rules R1, R2, R4, R7, 
and R9 selected from Table  2. Each rectangle represents a rules packet space. White 
space represents that the action of that rule is “Allow,” and Grey space represents that 
the action of that rule is “Deny.” Figure 4 shows the final segments formed for the rules 
considered. Each segment is either a non-overlapping segment or a non-conflicting or 
conflicting segment.
In this work, a BDD-based segmentation technique proposed in Hu et  al. (2012) is 
used to segment the rules into disjoint segments. This segmentation helps to identify 
Fig. 2 Example rule space
Fig. 3 Overlapped rule space
Fig. 4 Formation of Segments from the rule space
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clearly the boundary between intersected and non-intersected packet space. The seg-
mentation process is depicted in Algorithm 1.
A disjoint segment set S = {s1, s2 . . . , sn} must satisfy the following two properties:
1. Any pair of segments of S must be disjoint; i.e., si ∩ sj �= φ for i, j  ∈ 1 to n and i �= j;
2. Any two packet spaces, p ∈ si, where p �= p′, must match with an exact set of rules.
Algorithm 1 Segmentation of given ruleset R into set of disjoint segments S (Hu et al. 
2012)
Anomaly identification using grid representation
In a ruleset, one overlapping segment can be associated with two or more rules, and 
one rule can be associated with one or more segments. To ease further operation and 
represent the anomalies more precisely, “grid representation,” that is, a two-dimensional 
matrix representation, is generated by using ruleset R and set of segments S. The Grid 
representation of the ruleset provided in Table 2 is shown in Table 3.
In Table 3, “A” indicates that the action is Allow, and “D” indicates that the action is 
Deny. From the grid representation, one can obtain a clear view of exactly where anom-
alies are occurring. For example, segments 4, 5, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17 and 18 in Table  3 are 
non-overlapping segments and all of the remaining segments are overlapping. Among 
the overlapping segments, 1 and 2 are non-conflicting segments, and 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 
15 and 16 are conflicting segments. An anomaly can be easily identified based on the 
grid shown in Table 3. For example, rule 9 is shadowed by rule 4 because all of the sub-
spaces covered by rule 9 are also covered by rule 4 but with a different action, and rule 4 
contains additional subspaces that are not covered by Rule 9. Therefore, rule 9 is a subset 
of Rule 4 with a different action and hence shadowed. From the grid representation, rule 
9 is a generalized rule of rule 8 because all of the subspaces covered by rule 8 are also 
covered by rule 9 but with different actions, and Rule 9 covers additional subspaces that 
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are not covered by rule 8. From the grid, a correlation can be identified between rules 5 
and 6 because they share a common segment (subspace) s7 having different action. Fur-
thermore, there is a segment covered by rule 5 and not covered by rule 6 and vice versa. 
Redundant rules can also be identified from the grid. For example, “Rule 1” is redundant 
because, even when rule 1 is removed, the action taken by the firewall for a packet falling 
in the segment space of rule 1 does not change. However, redundancy depends upon the 
order of the rules; hence, redundant rules cannot be removed at this stage from the grid 
but can be removed only after the reordering phase.
Anomaly resolving
Some earlier works related to “packet-filter firewall policy anomalies,” which addressed 
the detection stage, and includes the following references (Liang et al. 2014; Hari et al. 
2000; Alex 2009; Pozo et al. 2008; Yuan et al. 2006; Benelbahri and Bouhoula 2007; Al-
Shaer and Hamed 2004a, b; Muhammad et al. 2006). A few works also addressed the 
resolving stage. Hari et al. (2000) proposed a “fast detect” framework that was able to 
detect and resolve correlation conflicts by reordering the rules. However, the authors 
were only able to address individual local conflicts; they were unable to address global 
conflicts. The authors used resolve filters to break circular loops formed by rules that 
could not be resolved by reordering. “Fast detect” is not suitable with present firewalls 
because it was designed based on two-tuple firewalls. The authors of Muhammad et al. 
(2006) tried to resolve the conflicts by only following a default deny policy, that is, by 
denying all of the packets that are in the conflict space. Hu et al. (2012) addressed the 
issue of both local and global conflict detection and resolution. To resolve the anoma-
lies, “Action Constraints” were generated for the conflicted segments, and reordering 
of rules was performed based on these action constraints. In the process of identify-
ing the best order of rules, a combination of greedy and permutation algorithms was 
proposed.
Table 3 Grid representation of example ruleset of Table 2
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Action constraint generation
In Hari et al. (2000), the authors defined a semi-automatic mechanism to generate action 
constraints. The authors introduced a “Risk Level (RL)” to each conflicted segment, 
which depended upon the “Risk Value.” “Risk Value (RV)” was calculated for every vul-
nerability in the network using the CVSS (Mell et al. 2007) score and Importance Value 
(IV) as shown in Eq. 1.
The RL for a conflicted segment is calculated as shown in Eq. 2, which is nothing but 
the accumulated RVs of vulnerabilities belonging to that segment.
where CS denotes conflicting segment, V(CS) is set of Vulnerabilities in CS, CVSS(v) is 
CVSS of Vulnerability v, IV (s) is IV of a Service “S,” and α is a factor assigned by the 
administrator to control the dependency of RL on the vulnerabilities in CS. The adminis-
trator also assigns IV to a service based on the importance of the service.
The CVSS is an open framework designed for calculation of the Risk involved in an 
organization. CVSS uses several metrics as discussed in Mell et al. (2007) for calculat-
ing vulnerability score. There are different strategies for generating action constraints 
as proposed by Hu et  al. (2012), which are shown in Table  4. The administrator can 
define customized threshold values of RL called upper limit (UL) and lower limit (LL). 
For a conflicted segment, if the obtained RL is greater than UL or less than LL, then the 
action constraint is generated automatically. The action constraint follows an automatic 
“Deny-Override” strategy when the RL is greater than the UL and an “Allow-Override” 
strategy if RL is less than the LL. However, when the RL is in-between LL and UL, a 
manual strategy selection is used. This study proposes an automatic action-constraint 
strategy.
Rule reordering and redundancy removal
Once Segmentation, Conflict Group Formation, and Action Constraint Generation is 
performed, based on the results, the administrator can manually change the order of the 
rules to eliminate conflicts. However, changing the order of the rules manually will be a 
tedious task when the size of the policy is huge. Therefore, an automated mechanism is 
to be used to reorder the rules by segment sets and their action constraints. The authors 




α × |V (CS)|
Table 4 Action constraint generating strategies (Hu et al. 2012)
Strategy Action constraint
Deny-override Action = “deny”
Allow-override Action = “ALLOW”
Recency-override Action of newest rule
Specificity-override Action of most-specific rule
High-majority-override Action of rules with greater number than opposite rules
First-match-override Action of first-matched rule
High-authority-override Action of rule with highest authority
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in Hu et al. (2012) used a combination of greedy and permutation to find the best possi-
ble order to resolve the conflicts. However, there is a limitation in this approach; an opti-
mal solution might not be obtained in all of the cases. This study proposes to use ACO 
to find the best possible order of rules, which can produce more-optimal results. FAME 
(Hu et al. 2012) also proposed a separate method to remove redundancy. However, it is 
a semi-automated approach. In our work, redundancy is automatically addressed by the 
ACO itself without the need of a separate process.
ACOFAME
This work proposes adaptive and automated detection and resolution of firewall policy 
anomalies. The proposed modifications include the following:
(a) The “Action Constraint Generation” is modified to include a TF for a source IP 
address to establish a relationship between security policy and the resolver, which 
increases the chance of security policy conformation after resolving and reordering.
(b) “Action Constraint Generation” is automated.
(c) ACO is used to address reordering and redundancy removal without the need for 
an additional redundancy removal phase.
(d) Anomaly detection and resolution for a newly added rule can be quickly performed 
adaptively, which can save much time compared with running the tool for n + 1 
rules.
“Trust Factor”‑based and automated “Action Constraint Generation”
The authors in Hu et al. (2012) used the CVSS score and IV for calculating RL of a con-
flicting segment. The CVSS score and IV are both defined from the organization’s asset, 
i.e., only the destination address of a packet. Considering destination system parameters 
alone when generating “Action Constraints” will increase the availability loss, which indi-
cates that the firewall will drop packets that are supposed to be allowed. Assume that the 
host “192.168.124.125” is an internal server with a high-RV, for example, 9 out of 10. An 
administrator adds Rule 97 to provide remote access to trusted host “172.19.23.22” with-
out knowing about rule 4 as shown in Table 5. An anomaly exists; rule 97 is shadowed 
by rule 4; hence, remote access from the trusted host will be denied. Figure 5 shows the 
segments formed by the two Rules 4 and 97. There exists a conflict as shown in segment 
2. Because the Risk calculation is based only on the destination address, although the 
administrator trusts the source host, his intention cannot be satisfied. Segment 2 denies 
the packet space as shown in Fig. 6 based on the action constraint generated by FAME.
Based on the security policy, a TF is allocated to all of the sources that are trusted by 
the administrator to obtain the intended behavior from the firewall. TF is used as one of 
the parameters in computing the new RL of a conflicted segment RL′CS as shown in Eq. 3. 
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where CS is conflicting segment, N(CS) is Number of (aS, ad), source and destination 
pairs, that belongs to CS, TF(aS) is TF of Source as, and RV ′(ad) is total risk associated 
with Destination ad as follows:
This work proposes a new and automated algorithm to generate action constraints 









Table 5 Sample ruleset
Rule Protocol Source IP Source port Destination IP Destination port Action
4 * * * 192.168.124.125 * Deny
. … … … … … …
. … … … … … …
97 TCP 172.19.23.22 * 192.168.124.125 22 Allow
Fig. 5 Segmentation of rule 4 and rule 97
Fig. 6 Segmentation after action constraint generation based on FAME
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The Modified RVs (RV ′) shown in Table 6 are calculated using Eq. 4, which uses Risk 
Value RV. The RV is calculated using Eq. 1, uses the CVSS framework suggested by Mell 
et al. (2007) and Hu et al. (2012). Table 7 shows that the TFs assigned by the administra-
tor for the scenario depicted in Fig. 1 are deduced from the security policy of Table 1.
Five strategies from among those suggested in Table 4 were used to automate action 
constraint generation completely as shown in Algorithm 2. When the RL is above the 
higher level, “Deny-Override” is chosen as the “Action Constraint.” When the RL is 
below the lower level, “Allow-Override” is chosen. Otherwise, Recency-Override with 
First-Match Override will come into effect. Therefore, the action of the first rule among 
the recent ones in that conflicted segment will be chosen. Here, recency number n is 
automatically obtained from the parameter “Recency Interval,” which will be set by the 
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administrator once as part of the organization’s policy before running ACOFAME. The 
value n is the serial number of the first rule among the set of recent rules. The recency 
strategy helps to decide the action to be taken in case of conflict. Whenever there is a 
new security need, the administrator will add a new rule based on that need, but there is 
a chance that the new rule might come into conflict with the earlier rules. In such a situ-
ation, the newly entered rules obviously must take priority over the earlier rules. If there 
are no such rules that fall under the recent rules, then specificity-override will be cho-
sen. Therefore, the action selected for that conflicted segment is that of the most specific 
rule among the rules covered in that segment. These strategies were proved promising 
with the help of result analysis, which will be discussed later.
By employing the proposed TF-based action constraint generation for the example 
scenario shown in Table 5, if the TF assigned to the trusted source IP of rule 97 is 1, then 
the new Risk Level RL′ for the conflicted segment s2 will be 0. Therefore, from the pro-
posed algorithm, the action constraint for segment s2 will be “Allow” as shown in Fig. 7. 
The administrator’s wish to allow a trusted host “172.19.23.22” of rule 97 is now satis-
fied, and the availability loss is reduced. Table 8 shows the action constraint generated by 
the proposed algorithm for the grid shown in Table 3. The last row of Table 8 shows the 
Strategies applied by Algorithm 2 for the given conflicted segments. The ‘–‘indicates that 
there is no conflict in that segment.
Motivation for applying ACO
The ACO algorithm is a metaheuristic (Dorigo and Caro 1999)-based optimization 
approach designed based on a biological ant system. The Swarm Intelligence approach 











Fig. 7 Segmentation after action constraint generation based on proposed algorithm
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is inspired by nature (Bonabeau et al. 1999). It primarily uses two factors, i.e., the phero-
mone and heuristic factors, as an aid in finding a solution. It was initially introduced 
by Dorigo et  al. (1991, 1996), Dorigo (1992) at the beginning of the 1990s. They used 
ACO to find an optimal path from a source to a destination through a group of nodes 
connected by multiple paths. The authors in Dorigo and Caro (1997) used ACO to 
solve the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), which is to find the best order of cities 
to travel to, minimize the total distance traveled. The distance between pairs of cities 
is used as a heuristic factor. To work with ACO, one must convert the given problem 
into a two-dimensional mesh. The authors in Liangjun et  al. (2008), Jensen and Shen 
(2003), Majdi and Derar (2013) proposed a Rough set attribute reduction using an ACO-
based approach to reducing the number of attributes in a dataset. They used Rough set 
Significance as a heuristic factor that was calculated when needed. The authors of Ravi 
Kiran Varma et al. (2015) proposed a novel ACO search for global best attributes by con-
sidering Rough Set-based attribute significance as the heuristic factor for Ant search. 
Apart from these examples, ACO is also used in solving many NP-Hard and combinato-
rial optimization problems. Some of these include vehicle traffic (Jabbarpour et al. 2014), 
University course timetabling (Socha et  al. 2002), Multicast Routing (Zhang and Liu 
2011), Stock Market Prediction (Binoy et  al. 2011), and Bankruptcy Prediction (Nigib 
et al. 2013). The authors of Broderick et al. (2014) employed ACO to solve a Software 
Project Scheduling problem. The heuristic factor changes based upon the type of prob-
lem. ACO was also used for feature selection in the signal-processing domain in Turker 
et  al. (2014). The work in Sreelaja and Vijayalakshmi (2010) proposed an ACO-based 
packet-filter firewall to overcome the drawbacks of the Neural Network, Binary search, 
and sequential search approaches.
This work proposes an ACO-based reordering algorithm by taking conflict resolving 
score (CRS) as a heuristic factor, which can be calculated as and when needed. The prob-
lem can be converted into a graph as shown in Fig. 8, in which each node is nothing but 
the firewall rule.
After converting the problem into a two-dimensional mesh network, artificial ants are 
released at random nodes. The ants will traverse from one node to another by selecting 
next node at each step using probability calculated from two factors that are a heuristic 
factor and pheromone factor using Eq. 5 (Dorigo and Thomas 2004).
i is present node, j is next node, τij is pheromone concentration on branch ij, ηij is heu-
ristic factor calculated for branch ij, and Nki  is remaining nodes that are not traversed by 
ant k.
The heuristic factor depends upon the type of problem. For example, for the TSP, the 
heuristic factor is calculated using the formula shown in Eq. 6.











if j ∈ Nki
0 otherwise
(6)ηij = 1/dij
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The parameters α and β are used to control the importance of heuristic and pheromone 
factors. If α = 0, the ants will select the next city closest to them, which turns ACO into 
simple greedy algorithms. If β = 0, only pheromone amplification will occur. Initially, 
the pheromone concentration will be same on all branches and hence in the first itera-
tion the movement of ants completely depends upon the heuristic factor. After every 
iteration, the pheromone is updated on the branches that are traversed and evaporated 
on all remaining branches that are not traversed. From the second iteration onwards, 
because of the varied pheromone concentration, the ants will start converging toward 
an optimal path, giving a common optimal solution after several iterations. The formula 
used to update and evaporate pheromones is shown in Eqs. 7 and 8, respectively.
Lk is the total distance of the path traversed by ant k, and ρ is the evaporation rate.
ACO heuristic for the problem domain and the resolver algorithm
After determining the action constraints, the goal is to find the best possible ordered 
combination of rules that produces the highest CRS. The CRS is nothing but the count of 
segments that satisfy the action constraints, which will be used in calculating heuristics 
for ACO as shown in Eq.  9. A segment is considered satisfied if the action constraint 
generated for that segment and the action of the first rule under that segment are the 
same. Otherwise, the segment is considered not satisfied.
For example, in the grid representation shown in Table 3, the action constraint gener-
ated for segment 7 is “ALLOW,” which was shown in Table 8. For the initial order of rules 
shown in Table 3, segment 7 is considered not satisfied because the first vertical sub-
space under that segment 7 is Rule 5, and its action is “DENY.” The CRS for this initial 
order is 14, as shown in Table 9, because 14 segments were satisfied and 4 segments were 
unsatisfied. The heuristic factor η used for this problem domain is shown in Eq. 9:







if ant k used edge ij in the tour
0 otherwise
Fig. 8 Sample ACO Graph of proposed approach
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tk is the set of rules traversed by ant k, i is the last rule of tk , j is the next rule to be tra-
versed, and CRS(tk), the number of segments satisfied, is calculated using Eq. 10:
Stk is the set of satisfied segments associated with tk
ACO algorithm applied to reorder the rules to resolve anomalies












Segments covered by (tk ∪ j )
(10)CRS(tk) =
∣∣Stk ∣∣
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Algorithm 3 shows the rule reordering process. imax number of ants are released in 
each iteration for amax iterations. In each iteration, every ant will find its own solution. 
For this problem, each solution is nothing but a possible order of rules. For the first iter-
ation, ants are released randomly because there will not be any influence of pheromone 
in the first iteration. Every ant finds a solution, an order of the rules by traversing each 
rule based on the selection probability. In this algorithm, the pheromone is updated for 
every ant’s solution so that the pheromone concentration increases toward the possible 
best solution. For each iteration, the iteration’s best ant solution is saved, which is noth-
ing but the solution with the highest CRS. The pheromone is evaporated at the end of 
each iteration. Finally, after the last iteration, the global best solution is determined.
Adaptive detection and resolution
This work also proposes a mechanism that adaptively reorders the existing rules when an 
administrator enters a new rule even after running the ACOFAME tool. The advantage 
is that much time will be saved when compared with running the tool for n + 1 rules 
again. The algorithm for adaptive reordering is shown in Algorithm 4. The input for this 
algorithm is the resolved and reordered ruleset after applying ACOFAME. When a new 
rule is entered by the administrator, it will be compared against the existing reordered 
ruleset R′ one by one, sequentially. The following are the possible situations.
Case 1: Subset and different action If the new rule r is a subset of the compared rule 
and the action of the compared rule and the new rule are not same. In this case, to make 
an appropriate decision concerning whether to “Allow” or “Deny,” an Action Constraint 
will be generated using Algorithm 2. If the generated action constraint is same as that of 
the new rule, then the new rule is inserted before the compared rule position in the reor-
dered ruleset and the reordered rule grid is updated. Conversely, if the generated Action 
Constraint is different, then obviously the new rule will be ignored.
Case 2: Subset and same action If the new rule r is a subset of the compared rule and 
the action of the compared rule and the new rule are same. In this case, the new rule will 
be a shadowed rule and redundant, and hence ignored.
Case 3: Intersection and different action If there exists an intersection or correlation 
among the new rule r and the compared rule, and the action of the compared rule and 
the new rule are not same. In this case, to make an appropriate decision concerning 
whether to “Allow” or “Deny,” an Action Constraint will be generated using Algorithm 2. 
If the generated action constraint is same as that of the new rule, then the new rule is 
inserted before the compared rule position in the reordered ruleset and the reordered 
rule grid is updated.
Case 4: Intersection and same action In this case, the new rule will not be inserted. The 
“if” condition of line number 11 of algorithm 4 will fail, and the new rule is sequentially 
checked with the remaining rules. Finally, if none of the cases match, then the new rule 
is appended to the existing reordered ruleset.
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Experimentation results and comparison
Lab environment and datasets
The experiments were performed on an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU 2.6 GHz with 2 GB RAM 
and the Windows 7 Operating System. The free parameters used in the ACO are set to 
the following values on a trial and error basis, and this set of parameters are found to 
be suitable: α = 1, β = 0.01, ρ = 0.9, and q = 0.9. The initial value of the pheromone is 
set to 0.5. As of now, there are no standard benchmark packet-filter firewall rules avail-
able. Five rulesets were used, named Policy 1–5, as shown in Table 10. The rulesets were 
collected from college and university level campus networks. The number of anomalies 
identified in each dataset is shown category-wise in Table 10. All the algorithms listed in 
this paper were developed using Java SE 1.7. Java with jpcap-0.6 was used for testing and 
simulation of firewall. Nping, network packer generation tool, was used to generate net-
work traffic for testing. Nessus vulnerability scanner was used in the process of identify-
ing vulnerabilities associated with the systems that belongs to the conflicted segments.
Resolved and reordered output of ACOFAME
The policies, the number of rules, the number of segments generated by the segmenta-
tion process and the time taken for segmentation are shown in Table 10 along with cate-
gories of anomalies found in each ruleset. The rules for Policy 1 are nothing but the rules 
shown in Table 2. The proposed ACOFAME algorithm was used to reorder the rules for 
all of the policies. The results of reordered rules and the reordered grid are shown in 
Tables 11 and 12, respectively.
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Performance evaluation parameters and comparison
The parameters that are used for evaluation and comparison of the proposed system are 
availability loss, security risk, number of resolved conflicts, number of redundant rules 
eliminated, and the time taken by the algorithm.
Availability loss
Availability loss (AL) Hu et al. (2012) is used to measure the effect of a firewall policy 
on network availability. Availability loss occurs if the action constraint generated for a 
conflicted segment is “ALLOW,” but the action taken by the firewall on that packet is 
“DENY.”
AL for a particular firewall policy ruleset P, is calculated using the formula shown in 
Eq. 11, which is a modified version of the availability loss equation proposed in Hu et al. 
(2012).
An example calculation of Availability Loss for the ruleset shown in Policy 1 (P1):
To calculate the AL of Policy 1, the conflicted segments of Policy 1 before reordering 
(Table  3) and the action constraints generated for those segments (Table  9) must be 
observed. Segment 7 (S7) was the only segment in which the generated action constraint 
was Allow but the performed action was Deny. In Segment 7, there is a conflict between 
rule 5 and rule 6. The source IP of the conflicted segment is “10.45.48.34,” and the desti-
nation IP of the conflicted segment is “10.12.32.21.” Therefore, the source, “10.45.48.34,” 
will not obtain web access to the web server; hence, availability loss occurs. From Eq. 3,
Substituting RL′(S7) in Eq. 11,
Availability Loss was calculated similarly for other rulesets (Policies 2–5). Note that 








RL′(S7) = RV ′(10.12.32.21)(1− TF(10.45.48.34))/1







= 10− RL′(S7) = 10− 3.6 = 6.4






















Policy 1 14 18 0.016 3 1 4 2
Policy 2 35 35 0.013 7 6 3 4
Policy 3 55 64 0.064 9 8 6 6
Policy 4 171 171 0.482 29 29 8 35
Policy 5 325 344 0.846 45 54 20 49
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because, after reordering Policy 1, the action taken by the firewall on conflicted segment 
S7 is “Allow,” and the generated action constraint is also “Allow.”
Security risk
Security Risk This parameter is helpful to measure the security risk to the organization’s 
network due to the firewall policy. It is calculated as shown in Eq. 12, which is a modified 
version of the security risk equation proposed in Hu et al. (2012).
An example calculation of Security Risk for the ruleset shown in Policy 1 (P1):
Conflicting segments whose first vertical action in the segments is “Allow” must be iden-
tified. From Table 3, Policy 1 has 7 conflicting segments. These segments are
For each segment of CS(P1), we must calculate RL′(cs). A sample calculation for 
RL′(S3) is shown:
The packet space covered by Segment 3 is
“* 172.19.55.121 * 10.12.32.23–10.12.32.26 *”
In this packet space, there is one source, aS1, which is “172.19.55.121,” and four des-
tinations, ad 1 to ad 4, which are “10.12.32.23–10.12.32.26.” Therefore, the number of 
source–destination pairs is 4. Calculation of RL′ for conflicted segment 3 (s3) using Eq. 3 
is shown as an example.

































































Table 11 Reordered output of ACOFAME (input: Policy 1)
Rule Protocol Source IP Source port Destination IP Destination port Action
1 TCP 10.44.128.112 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
2 * 10.*.*.* * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
3 * 10.45.48.34 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
4 TCP 192.168.5.64 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
5 TCP 172.19.55.* * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
6 * 10.*.*.* * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
7 * 172.19.55.123 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
8 TCP 192.168.15.253 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
9 TCP 172.19.55.121 * 10.12.32.24 20–21 Allow
10 * 172.19.55.121 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
11 * 172.19.55.121–172.19.55.124 * 10.12.32.* * Allow
12 * 172.19.64.221 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
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The Security Risks of other rulesets are calculated similarly.
Comparison of evaluation parameters
To prove the influence and importance of TF in reducing Availability Loss, the ALs of 
reordered policies proposed by the FAME method and our method are calculated and 
compared. The ALs of policies reordered with the help of the action-constraint genera-
tion methodology of FAME are provided in column 5 of Table 13. The policies show a 
certain amount of Availability Loss even after reordering, whereas the ALs of policies 
reordered with the help of action constraints generated based on TF are 0. Table 13 also 
shows the total number of segments generated, number of conflicted segments, and 
time taken for action constraint generation. It is clear that there is no availability loss 
with our approach.
Table 14 shows the experimental results for all of the five policy rule sets. The second 
column depicts the actual conflicts existing in each policy. The third column shows the 
number of Resolved Conflicts (RC) and time taken to resolve the conflicts by the Per-
mutation method proposed by Hu et al. (2012). The fourth column shows the number of 
RC and time taken to resolve the conflicts by the Greedy method proposed by Hu et al. 
(2012). The fifth column shows the number of RC and time taken to resolve the conflicts 
by the Combination method proposed by Hu et al. (2012). The sixth column shows the 
number of RC, the time taken to resolve the conflicts, and the number of Rules Elimi-
nated (RE) automatically due to redundancy by the ACOFAME. The seventh and last 
column shows the percentage of conflicts resolved and clearly indicates that ACOFAME 
has outperformed FAME with respect to conflicts resolved. The values in the italics indi-
cates improvement in the results. One advantage of ACOFAME is that the redundancy 
=
(10× (1− 0.6))+ (9× (1− 0.6))+ (10× (1− 0.6))+ (10× (1− 0.6))












= RL′(S3)+ RL′(S6)+ RL′(S10)+ RL′(S11)+ RL′(12)+ RL′(15)+ RL′(16)
= 3.9+ 1.8+ 7.6+ 2.5+ 4.9+ 2.8+ 4.5 = 28
Table 13 Comparison of availability loss after reordering of policy rules with action con-
straints generated by FAME and ACOFAME











(with action  
constraints  
generated by FAME)
Availability loss  
(with action  
constraints generated 
by ACOFAME)
Policy 1 18 8 <1 18 0
Policy 2 35 19 2 35 0
Policy 3 64 33 2 64 0
Policy 4 171 77 7 171 0
Policy 5 344 164 59 344 0
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removal and anomaly resolving is performed simultaneously as opposed to with the 
FAME method, in which each is a different phase.
The results shown in Table 14 indicate that ACOFAME can resolve more conflicts than 
can the other approaches. ACOFAME requires less time to resolve than the permuta-
tion approach does, but more time than do the greedy and FAME approaches. Although 
ACOFAME requires more time to resolve the conflicts than FAME does, this drawback 
can be neglected because the Availability Loss and Security Risk are the least compared 
with other approaches.
Figure  9 is the comparative graph showing the Availability Loss for each case. Best 
Case is true when the action performed by the firewall is the same as the organization’s 
intended action in the respective conflicted segments. Worst Case is true when the fire-
wall “Denies” all of the packets that fall under the conflicted segments. Given Policy 
is the availability loss calculated for the policy under consideration before reordering. 
FAME is the availability loss obtained by the FAME algorithm (Hu et al. 2012). ACO-
FAME is the proposed work; the proposed approach is very close to the Best Case, and 
the Availability Loss is much less than with existing approaches.
Figure 10 is the comparative graph showing the Security Risk for each case. Best Case 
is the same as in Availability Lost, However, in calculating Security Risk, Worst Case is 
true when the firewall “ALLOWS” all of the packets that fall under the conflicted seg-
ments. The Security Risk was reduced compared with the Given Policy, which is nothing 



















RC Time (s) RC Time (s) RC Time (s) RC Time (s) RE FAME ACOFAME
1 8 8 0.142 3 0.016 8 0.128 8 0.196 2 100 100
2 19 19 0.229 13 0.018 19 0.178 19 0.918 4 100 100
3 33 33 31.215 25 0.040 31 0.589 33 4.447 6 93.93 100
4 77 – ∞ 63 0.046 71 25.281 77 122.28 35 92.92 100


















Best Case Worst Case Given Policy
FAME ACOFAME
Fig. 9 Availability loss evaluation
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but the original policy before reordering. However, the Security Risk is slightly higher 
compared with FAME because FAME will DENY packets in cases in which the organi-
zation’s/administrator’s intention is to ALLOW, as discussed with an example in “ACO-
FAME” section.
Advantage of adaptive reordering when a new rule is appended
To evaluate the adaptive rule editing mechanism, the time taken to check one rule adap-
tively is compared with the time taken by ACOFAME to recheck the entire policy with 
n + 1 rules, as shown in Table 15. The time taken for checking a rule by our adaptive mech-
anism is much smaller than the time taken for rechecking the entire policy with n + 1 rules.
Case study 1: Comparison of ACOFAME with Saadaoui et al. (2014)
Results when ACOFAME applied to the ruleset data of Saadaoui et al. (2014)
As a case study, our approach is also compared with a recent similar work proposed in 
Saadaoui et al. (2014). The authors Saadaoui et al. (2014) suggested novel methods for 
anomaly detection and resolution. They used a two-level approach. In level one, super-
fluous anomalies were eliminated, and in level two, conflicting rule-class anomalies were 
eliminated. However, the security policy was verified only in level two, i.e., for conflict-
ing class anomalies, whereas the proposed ACOFAME builds a relationship to the secu-
rity policy and the conflict resolver through RVs and TFs.
Experiments were conducted to compare our approach with the second topology 

















Best Case Worst Case
Given Policy FAME
ACOFAME
Fig. 10 Security risk
Table 15 Advantage of adaptive rule reordering mechanism
Policy no. Time taken for adaptive  
checking one rule (s)
Time taken by ACO 
to recheck n + 1 rules (s)
Policy 1 0.002 0.198
Policy 2 0.002 0.987
Policy 3 0.004 4.620
Policy 4 0.006 118.57
Policy 5 0.007 1853.44
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available for comparison. The ruleset related to that topology is shown in Table 16. The 
implementation was done on the Java platform.
Based on the security policy given and the topology, RVs for all of the destinations 
were calculated based on the framework discussed in ““Trust Factor”-based and auto-
mated “Action Constraint Generation”” section. This framework is a modified version 
of the CVSS framework discussed in “Action constraint generation” section. A few 
assumptions were made in calculating the RVs of all of the subzones presented in Fig. 9 
of Saadaoui et al. (2014) because we cannot obtain all of the details of the parameters 
required to calculate RV. However, the assumptions are valid because the security pol-
icy and the administrator’s experience are considered. TFs are also assigned to all of 
the subzones of the second topology provided in Fig. 9 of Saadaoui et al. (2014) based 
on the security policy they provided. Any subzone can be either source or destination. 
TFs are assigned to sources as shown in Table  17, and RVs are assigned as shown in 
Table 18 to destinations. A TF of 0.4 (anything less than half ) is assigned to 10.0.0.1 and 
192.168.0.0/24 because they were mentioned in the security policy and were denied 
access to subzone31. Other sources are assigned 0 because there are no data available 
regarding these sources in the security policy. Concerning RVs, subzone31 was men-
tioned in the security policy. Because servers or systems in that zone are typically asso-
ciated with high risk, 8 was assigned. For all other destinations, an average risk of 5 is 
assumed. Table 19 shows the output of ACOFAME, and it can be verified that the output 
also conforms to the security policy mentioned in Saadaoui et al. (2014). Table 19 also 
Table 16 Ruleset of Saadaoui et al. (2014)
Rule no. Action Protocol Port no. SIP DIP
R1 Accept TCP 80 10.0.0.0/16 172.16.0.22/30
R2 Accept TCP 80 10.1.0.0/16 172.16.0.22/30
R3 Deny TCP 80 192.168.0.0/23 172.16.0.22/30
R4 Deny TCP 80 10.0.0.0/15 172.16.0.22/30
R5 Deny TCP 80 192.168.0.0/24 172.16.0.22/30
R6 Deny TCP 80 192.168.1.0/24 172.16.0.22/30
R7 Deny TCP 80 10.0.0.1 172.16.0.0/16
R8 Deny TCP * 10.0.0.1 172.16.0.22/30
R9 Accept TCP 80 192.168.0.0/24 172.16.0.0/16
Table 17 List of source addresses and their trust factors assigned based on the topology 
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shows that the ACOFAME has produced fewer rules compared with the approach of 
Saadaoui et al. (2014) but at the same time conforming to the security policy.
Results when algorithm of Saadaoui et al. (2014) is applied to ruleset of Table 2 with security 
policy of Table 1
The ruleset of the study listed in Table 2 was also processed through the approach pro-
posed in Saadaoui et al. (2014). At level 1, all shadowed and redundant rules are elimi-
nated. Rules 7, 8, 9, 12, and 13 were shadowed by rule 4 and hence were removed. Rule 1 
was redundant with respect to rule 4; hence, rule 1 was eliminated. The output after level 
1 is shown in Table 20. Java programming was used in the implementation.
The output of level-1 is now applied to level-2, the conflict rule-class anomalies 
resolver. Rules 4 and 5 (5 and 6 in the actual input) were correlated, and based on secu-
rity policy, a new rule is added before rule 5 saying allow communication through the 
correlated part. The final resolved output is shown in Table 21. Comparing this output 







Table 19 Resolved output of ACOFAME for the ruleset of Table 3 of Saadaoui et al. (2014)
Original rule no. Order Action Protocol Port no. SIP DIP
R2 R1 Accept TCP 80 10.1.0.0/16 172.16.0.22/30
R4 R2 Deny TCP 80 10.0.0.0/15 172.16.0.22/30
R3 R3 Deny TCP 80 192.168.0.0/23 172.16.0.22/30
R9 R4 Accept TCP 80 192.168.0.0/24 172.16.0.0/16
R8 R5 Deny TCP * 10.0.0.1 172.16.0.22/30













2 1 TCP 172.19.55.* * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
3 2 TCP 192.168.5.64 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
4 3 * 172.19.55.121–
172.19.55.124
* 10.12.32.* * Allow
5 4 * 10.45.48.34 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
6 5 * 10.*.*.* * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
10 6 TCP 192.168.15.253 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
11 7 TCP 10.44.128.112 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
14 8 * 172.19.64.221 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
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with Table  11, which is the output of ACOFAME, Table  21, which was generated by 
Saadaoui et al. (2014) has fewer rules than does Table 11, which was generated by ACO-
FAME. However, rules 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10 in Table 21 conform to the security policy of 
Fig. 1, whereas rules 5, 7, and 8 do not conform to the security policy. Therefore, with the 
help of modified TF-based RV calculations and by applying the ACO search based on 
the CRS, the proposed approach is feasible and has added value to existing approaches.
Conclusion and future scope
In this study, an ACOFAME was proposed that can automatically detect and resolve 
packet-filter firewall anomalies. A relationship between the Security Policy and the 
resolver was established by introducing the concept of TF. The TF-based Action Con-
straint Generation has reduced the Availability Loss and increased the chance of the 
resolved ruleset conforming to the security policy. The bio-inspired Ant Colony Opti-
mization algorithm proved successful in finding the best possible reordering of firewall 
rules, which can resolve more conflicts than existing methods can at a cost of increased 
computational time for larger rule sizes. ACOFAME also eliminated the need for a 
separate rule redundancy phase. The adaptive reordering technique will be helpful in 
reducing the significant amount of time required to mitigate anomalies when a new rule 
is appended. This research proposes a practically feasible and implementable solution 
that will be of great help to administrators and organizations that maintain a packet-
filter firewall. A limitation that is worth mentioning is that the source IP address can be 
subject to spoofing attacks and must be addressed separately. As a future work, other 
bio-inspired optimization techniques can be considered and compared. This work can 
also be extended to distributed firewalls. Furthermore, research might be warranted 
to inquire about other possible Action Constraint Generation strategies such as High 
Authority Override or other techniques, and situational-based usage of strategies can be 
verified.
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2 1 TCP 172.19.55.* * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
3 2 TCP 192.168.5.64 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
4 3 * 172.19.55.121–
172.19.55.124
* 10.12.32.* * Allow
New 4 * 10.45.48.34 * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
5 5 * 10.45.48.34 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
6 6 * 10.*.*.* * 10.12.32.21 80 Allow
10 7 TCP 192.168.15.253 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
11 8 TCP 10.44.128.112 * 10.12.32.23 23 Allow
14 9 * 172.19.64.221 * 10.12.32.* * Deny
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